By Joseph W. Ballantine.
The Brookings Institution,
Washington, D. C. 1952.
xi+218 pages, U. S. $2.75
Mr. Ballantine has written a solid and compact book on Taiwan. The book is published under the auspices of the now well-known International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution whose objective is to aid in the development of an informed and responsible American public opinion on foreign policy. The purpose of this book in particular, the Brookings Institution states, is "to acquaint the general reader with the position of the United States with respect to Formosa and with the facts and considerations pertinent to forming judgments on ways and means for dealing with the problem presented."
The author, Mr. Ballantine, is both a diplomat and a scholar on Far Eastern affairs. Before joining the Brookings Institution, he served as director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State in 1944-1945, and as special assistant to the Secretary of State in 1945-47. His firsthand knowledge of Taiwan dates back to 1912 when he was in charge of the American consulate there. His latest known connection with official Washington in the field of Far Eastern policy was his attendance of the Round Table Conference on China summoned by the State Department in October, 1949.
The book is divided into three parts. The first two parts deal with (1) the physical setting and prewar history of the island of Taiwan; (2) the political developments on the Chinese mainland after World War II; (3) the course of U. S. policy with regard to Taiwan; and (4) international developments as they affect free China. The third part contains an analysis of the present situation on Taiwan and of what the author regards as "unresolved problems."
Mr. Ballantine's approach to the subject is apparently one of a realistic observer with the best national interest of the United States in mind. He seems to give the reader the impression that America's ultimate objective in Taiwan is, at best, not crystallized, if not entirely undecided upon. It is quite understandable, as the author says, that the United States found itself without a prepared policy toward Taiwan in December, 1949, immediately after the Chinese Communists overran the mainland. Since then, the author observes, the steps taken by the United States towards the crystallization of a policy have been small and tentative; and each step was taken with a backward look. All steps, however, were taken in the same direction towards closer cooperation with the Government of Free China.
On the basis of these observations, the author inclines to think that a long-range policy toward Taiwan cannot be formulated and pursued without arousing, international repercussions which might be prejudicial to the best interest of the United States. This thinking leads him to interpret Truman's 1950 announcement "neutralizing" Taiwan as a measure of postponing any further decision on Taiwan or a measure "to let matters rest for the time being." He implies that the "neutralization" policy would remain in force for a long time to come until there is a "general settlement" in the Far East. But America's policy toward Taiwan is not so rigidly frozen is the author suggests, despite the stalemate in Korea. For instance, President Eisenhower's new order to the Seventh Fleet announced on February 2 less than a month after the publication of Mr. Ballantine's book is certainly a long forward stride in the process of evolution of a long-range policy toward Taiwan. This, however, does not mean that Mr. Ballantine's observations have been overtaken by the development of events. For a forward-moving trend of America's Taiwan policy is clearly envisaged by the author, although he does not say in specific terms what next steps the United States will take in the future. In fact, it is not the purpose of this book to chart a course of American action in Taiwan.
To Mr. Ballantine, the biggest "unresolved problem" is the problem of the ultimate direction of America's policy in Taiwan. To what extent should the United States support Free China? The scale, according to the author, ranges between the minimum commitments of preventing the island from falling into Communist hands to the maximum commitment of seeing to it that the government of Free China succeeds in regaining its authority on the Chinese mainland. Here, Mr. Ballantine perceives a discrepancy between American public opinion and official American action. The American people, who recognize the importance of China to the stability of the Far East, are intuitively disposed to accept the view that there can be no solution for Asia unless Formosa is developed as a base for the recovery of the mainland. The official action, on the other hand, is lagging behind public opinion, chiefly owing to the concerted efforts of some of America's European and Asian allies to restrain the United States from taking any positive step, However, the American government is moving fast to implement its action in line with public opinion. As the author puts it: "American action in the course of two years (1951-52) carried support of the National Government (of China) to a point that is closer to the maximum connotation of a policy of support than to the minimum."
Mr. Ballantine in his concluding pages brings out an interesting question: Should the United States allow its Formosa policy to govern its Far Eastern policy? Or, should its Formosa policy be subordinated to an overall Far Eastern policy? The author fails to define what this general overall Far Eastern policy is. He only says that once the United States is committed to the cause of Free China, i.e., the recovery of the mainland, America's responsibility in Taiwan would be so great that it found place America's commitments elsewhere in Asia in a subordinate position. It ought to be amply clear by now that American support of Taiwan is inextricably related to America's policy toward the Chinese Red regime, which, in turn, should form the backbone of America's policy in the whole Far East. Taiwan in international politics cannot be treated as an isolated geographical area in Asia. It is a rallying point for free Chinese and a springboard to the mainland. The proportion of American: support of Taiwan may appear now to be far exceeding what the physical size of Taiwan warrants. But until Taiwan is built up to such an extent that it can effectively challenge the Chinese Communists on the mainland, there will be little hope of an honorable settlement in the Far East.
It seems to this reviewer that the question today is not whether one set of foreign policy should be subordinate to the other, but rather, who and where provides the free world with the best opportunity for the restoration of peace and freedom to 450,000,000 people who occupy the center of the Asiatic subcontinent. The importance of a Free China to a free world is deftly stated by the author as follows: "Statesmen may be expected not to overlook considerations" of the significance of an ultimately free China to the entire free world. China occupies a large and strategically situated segment of the earth's surface. Its hundreds of millions of people, with their heritage of sturdy individualism and habits of industry and thrift, have a potential capacity to contribute much, under favorable circumstances, to the common well-being and advancement of all mankind. This had been demonstrated by the richness of China's cultural gifts to surrounding peoples. A further important consideration is the value that would accrue from a restored trade between China, on the one hand, and Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Western world, on the other. Conversely, the stultification and perversion that the Chinese people have undergone under Communism can do--and is already doing--incalculable harm to the peace-loving peoples of the world."-Alfred Tan
GREAT MISTAKES OF THE WAR
By Hanson W. Baldwin
Alvin Redman, London
1950,105 pp.
This study is penetrating analysis of U.S., wartime political and strategic mistakes which have contributed to the abortive peace in the postwar world. The mistakes were diverse and major. This is no catalogue of all of them, but merely a notation of a selected few of the broad and far-reaching errors which have serious political consequences.
This is a study of the war from the standpoint of the peace. Written with scholarly objectivity and searching insight, it brings the intricate problems of the war into a simple, readable treatment and provides a handy reference for those who may be interested. The book is divided into three parts dealing respectively with: (1) the basic fallacy, (2) Germany and Russia--the struggle in Europe, and (3) Japan and Russia--the struggle in the Pacific. In the small compass of a hundred pages practically all the most important problems of the war are discussed with the benefit of hindsight.
The author proceeds on the assumption that Americans are politically immature. Unlike the British or the Russians, he says, they have had no grand design and, overall concept. Throughout their history they have fought for the immediate victory, not for the ultimate peace. During World War II they were obsessed by the perennial American hope for the millennium and by the warm sense of comradeship with the Russians which the common object of victory induced. While the British and the Russians fought with an eye to the big picture of the world after the war, the Americans fought to win only. In terms of general war aims, they did not know what they were fighting for. (pp. 1-3)
The New York Times military editor decides that the major American wartime blunders were all part and parcel of this political immaturity. This was particularly manifest in U.S. relationship with the Russians during the war. American policy, according to him, was founded on four great basic premises, namely: (1) The Kremlin had abandoned its policy of world revolution; (2) Stalin was a "good fellow" with whom one could get along; (3) Russia might make a separate peace with Germany; and (4) Russian entry into the war was essential to defeat Japan. (p. 4) As a matter of fact, however, all these four premises were false, as can be seen from all postwar investigations. That the ostensible dissolution of the Communist International in 1943 did not change the Soviet ultimate aim has been demonstrated by subsequent events. President Roosevelt's optimistic nature, his ready confidence in man, and his personal inclination to conduct diplomacy on a man-to-man basis without leaning upon a vigorous Secretary of State all combined to lead him into misjudgment of Stalin. It is clear that from the Russian point of view a separate peace with Germany was out of the question, especially in the closing years of the war. In the interests of all mankind, the world's two great dictatorships should have been made to fight for one another to a frazzle. Contrary to our expectations, Great Britain and the United States went all out for Germany's unconditional surrender to the advantage of Russia. Moreover, for reasons that defy logical reasoning, Roosevelt begged Stalin to enter the Pacific war, though that was obviously not called for. It should have been apparent that Russia would have to participate in the Pacific war at any cost and that it would' only be to the interests of the democracies to bar the advance of Russia in the Far East. Unfortunately, Roosevelt had no adequate knowledge of Russian strengths, purposes and motivations. He cut his own throat to the amazement of the world.
Against the background of such basic fallacy, Roosevelt, oftener than not in common with Churchill, committed a series of political blunders that frustrated the peace. Of these, in the opinion of the author, unconditional surrender was perhaps the worst one. The weak point of unconditional surrender lies in the fact that it failed to drive a wedge between the Nazis and the German people and that therefore it invited unconditional resistance, prolonged the war, and helped to lead to the abortive peace. Thus, when the war was over, Europe was virtually a political vacuum. Germany was beaten. Great Britain was weakened. France had just won liberation from the German conquest. Throughout the Continent, mental and physical strengths were almost completely exhausted. The situation was ideal to Communism. It was an opportunity to which Stalin had long looked forward. So when victory came, Soviet Communism quickly moved in to fill that vacuum. The total result was that the Continental balance of power was replaced by Russia's hegemony.
Unconditional surrender was a policy designed to prevent a separate peace between Russia and Germany. The separate peace, as pointed out above, was impossible. So the very premise on which this policy was based was false. As the author notes in his book the phrase "unconditional surrender" originated with Roosevelt at Casablanca. It was not a casual inspiration as it has been made to appear, but a deliberate decision which was "deeply embedded in Roosevelt's, war philosophy." Churchill did give "support" to that policy, though he has since the war tried to dissociate himself from it. (pp. 17-19) Strangely enough, Stalin never had, a hand in its formulation, apparently because he wanted to exploit the anti-Hitler opposition in Germany. (p. 14)
Unconditional surrender, which was originally meant for Germany, was applied to Japan also. The paradox was that it was made conditional when the Japanese Emperor was finally allowed to remain on the throne.
There is no doubt that unconditional surrender was a policy of anarchy which at once delayed the military victory and undermined the political peace. As the author observes, it indicated Roosevelt's predilection for snap decisions and personalized policies--a fault shared to a considerable degree by Churchill.
But Churchill was tempered by a riper wisdom than Roosevelt, after all. This was illustrated in their different strategic concepts regarding a second front in Europe. Churchill was throughout in favor of a Balkan invasion, while Roosevelt persistently advocated an invasion of Western Europe. These two different concepts, according to the author, were the product of two different patterns of experience of long standing: the United States sought only military victory, while Great Britain looked toward the peace. From the military point of view, Roosevelt might be right, for his military strategy led to Germany's unconditional surrender in the end. But the crux of the matter is that his pattern of strategy also led to the loss of Eastern and Central Europe. That is the root of all questions of Europe today. Of course, Churchill would not be so foolish as to favor winning the peace by losing the war. What he had in mind was a Europe with Nazi Germany beaten and Communist Russia weakened when the war was over. Indeed, if a Balkan invasion had been undertaken as Churchill advised, the whole picture of postwar Europe would have been different. So when the invasion of Normandy was decided upon at Teheran on November 30, 1943, the postwar political fate of Eastern Europe was already determined.
It is interesting to note that while the Roosevelt-Churchill haggling over European strategy was going on, Stalin was always on the side of Roosevelt. The intuitive, straightforward Roosevelt and the realistic, scheming Stalin apparently shared a mutual deep understanding and warm personal regard for each other. In the words of Mr. Baldwin, the personality of each attracted the other; the language barrier helped rather than' handicapped the process; Stalin's flattery, not his subtle manipulations, reached Roosevelt. As one great witness of those days has put it, "Roosevelt and Stalin were on the same side in any disagreement." (p. 33) Indeed, they got along not only at Teheran, but also at Yalta.
At Yalta, Stalin put on a remarkable performance. As he knew what was in Roosevelt's mind, he exploited it with consummate skill. He achieved his ends by artful manipulation. Roosevelt was bluff and hearty, imbued with idealism and international altruism, too often unmoderated by practical politics. In addition to the vision of a "brave new world," i.e., the establishment of the basic framework of the United Nations, Roosevelt was obsessed with a desire to secure Russian commitments to enter the Pacific war. Stalin had come to realize this desire of Roosevelt's long before. As early as 1943, at Teheran, Roosevelt had suggested the establishment of Dairen as an international free port for the benefit of Russia. Now at Yalta, a decisive opportunity came for Stalin. And he made the most of it.
By reason of sheer ignorance and inexcusable miscalculations, Roosevelt placed himself in the unthinkable position of a fearful, suppliant ally, anxious at any cost to get Russia to fight against Japan. At the time of Yalta, as Mr. Baldwin points out, Japan had already been beaten through attrition and blockade. The home islands were severed from the empire by the Allied conquest of the Philippines and the Marianas. Industry was disrupted and production rapidly reduced. Shortages of raw materials and the pinch of hunger had severely weakened Japanese resistance. But due to mistakes in intelligence all this seriousness of the Japanese plight was not fully understood. False intelligence made for erroneous assessment of the enemy. Japan's intentions were confounded with her capabilities. Though there were quite a few intelligence estimates based on factual reports and verified by subsequent investigations, they never reached the top echelon. The one estimate which served as the basis of decisions at Yalta was extremely pessimistic and unfounded. This estimate claimed that there were at least 700,000 men in the Kwantung Army (and a total of 2,000,000 on the Asiatic mainland) and that they were first-rate troops, well trained and well armed. Without Russian assistance, it was estimated the Japanese might be able to prolong the war on the mainland (even after the main islands of Japan had been conquered) until the autumn of 1946 or even until 1947 or 1948. (pp. 73-75) As revealed by postwar examinations, all this was sheer moonshine.
Filled with political misconceptions and military miscalculations, Roosevelt went to Yalta. There he wrote the darkest chapter of the long history of the war, the effect of which began to make itself felt as soon as hostilities ceased. Stalin drove a hard bargain there. He promised to enter the war against Japan in an estimated 90 days after the end of the war against Germany. For this he got the Kurile Islands and all the special privileges Russia had enjoyed before 1904. These include southern Sakhalin, preeminent interests in railways in Manchuria, Port Arthur, and a Russian-controlled "free port" in Dairen. Thus, Stalin gained control of the whole important area of Northeast Asia at a stroke. In this regard, Mr. Baldwin writes:
"These agreements were made with no representative of China, the country most affected by them, present; we undertook the amazing task of helping to secure Chinese acquiescence in arrangements which in effect gave away Chinese territory and advanced the border of Communist Russia almost to Peiping. Nor did we do this gently. The Chinese ratified the Yalta agreements under pressure from the United States, or as the recently issued China White Paper (“United States Relations with China") explains it: ‘The American view is that the Yalta agreement shall be complied with--no more, no less.’
"The fault was doubly grievous. We not only hurt our own interests and those of a friendly ally, but at Yalta--inferentially, at least--we broke our pledged word to that ally. For at Cairo in 1943, before the Teheran conference and after Stalin had told Hull in Moscow that Russia would enter the Pacific war, we promised publicly the restoration of Manchuria to China. And to a pragmatic politician, Russian control of Port Arthur and a half interest in the Manchurian railways could only mean Soviet strategic hegemony Over Manchuria.” (pp.81-82)
The author makes it clear that political mistakes are inevitable, as men are fallible, and that if we are ever to learn from our mistakes, we must identify them. That is good sense. Today, the new leaders of the Kremlin have thrown out fresh feelers to keep us guessing. The effect of their latest peace offensive is already telling, as can be seen from the fact that many a well-wisher of the world believes it looks like the real thing. This book teaches that Stalin's smile was worse than his anger. Probably this is also true of Malenkov. -Hsiao Tso-liang
Serve Him Right!
Chiu Ch'un once called on Monk Shan at Hangchow. Haughty were the manners of the monk and he gave the caller the cold shoulder. Meanwhile some kinsfolk of the local officials came and the monk was all obsequiousness. That was too much for Chiu, and so when those dandies had withdrawn he protested to the monk, "What's the idea of giving me and those dandies such different entertainment?" Shan said, "To show respect is not to respect; to respect is not to show respect." Chiu instantly raised his cane, gave him a sound cudgeling, and said, "No offence. To cudgel is not to cudgel; not to cudgel is to cudgel. " -Shen Ti: Hsieh Shih